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1 Introduction
In the OECD area, differentials in productivity growth rates have been widening since the
early 1990s (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Most of this gap derives from service industries,
where the regulatory framework is found to be severally detrimental for TFP growth, espe-
cially in Europe (Inklaar et al., 2008). This form of regulation generates sizeable negative
effects on productivity even outside the tertiary sector, because of the intense intermedi-
ate transactions between producers and users of service inputs (Bourle`s et al., 2013). One
important channel through which service (upstream) regulation influences productivity in
manufacturing (downstream) industries is by influencing the outcome of research (Amable
et al., 2009). Despite the relevant contribution provided by such pioneering studies, it still
remains unexplained how imperfections in regulated intermediate input markets reverberate
on manufacturing innovation. The object of the present paper is to identify one possible
mechanism of transmission.
We postulate that upstream product market regulation (PMR) changes the ability of
downstream industries (and firms) to efficiently manage R&D resources and carry out the
complex set of innovation tasks. When intermediate input markets work imperfectly – due
to administrative barriers, licensing, etc. – innovating firms suffer from difficulties in prop-
erly allocating factors of production, and cannot focus on their core activities due to the
difficulty to outsource marginal tasks. Moreover, upstream regulation concurs to erecting
entry barriers in downstream markets, changing the competitive pressure and incentives to
innovate. Because of these factors, innovating firms may reach sub-optimal levels of R&D
efficiency, falling below the frontier of knowledge production.
We study the role of the regulatory setting of the upstream product markets by esti-
mating a knowledge production function through a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). In
contrast to most existing works that exploit only one dimension of data variation (industry
or country), we use a fully comprehensive dataset covering fifteen manufacturing industries
in ten OECD economies between 1990 and 2002. As widely documented in the literature,
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this was a period of intense pro-competition initiatives, rapid technological advancements
but profoundly diverging patterns in productivity growth. In identifying the regulation im-
pact on R&D efficiency, we control for the institutional setting governing the functioning of
the technology, the labour and the financial market, as well as several forms of heterogeneity
such as, for instance, non-linearities in the effect of PMR along its distribution.
Our results provide robust evidence that upstream regulation remarkably reduces effi-
ciency levels in manufacturing innovation. The marginal unit impact of PMR is larger in
less regulated economies. It suggests that sizable improvements in R&D efficiency cannot
be expected at the initial stages of deregulation and that market liberalization takes time to
produce widespread effects within the economy. We also find that the negative relationship
between marginal impact and level of regulation strengthened during the 1990s when prod-
uct market reforms were launched by most OECD economies. Overall, potential gains from
deregulation are larger for those countries characterised by more restrictive administrative
barriers to competition.
This paper makes an important contribution to three streams of literature. First, it con-
tributes to the growing body of studies on the linkages between institutions and innovation
(Nelson, 2008), by specifically exploring one dimension of the regulatory setting (upstream
product market regulation) and identifying one channel of transmission (R&D efficiency).
Second, it broadens understanding of the growth effects of competition policies. Earlier
studies have looked at the effect of regulation on investment (Alesina et al., 2005), occu-
pational outcomes (Griffith et al., 2007, Fiori et al., 2012), workforce training (Bassanini
and Brunello, 2011), export performance (Barone and Cingano, 2011), productivity growth
and convergence to the frontier (Buccirossi et al., 2013, Bourle`s et al., 2013). Third, relying
upon recent developments in stochastic frontier analysis, we extend the literature seeking to
identify the key factors underlying productivity growth (Kneller and Stevens, 2006, Henry
et al., 2009) R&D and patenting (Wang, 2007, Fu and Yang, 2009, Cullmann et al., 2012).
The remainder of the paper is the following. Section 2 surveys the literature on the
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nexus between product market regulation and innovation. Section 3 defines the analytical
framework, discusses the econometric methodology and then presents data. Section 4 reports
both descriptive statistics and the econometric evidence. Section 5 discusses the results and,
finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Product market regulation and innovation
Theoretical background
The latest Schumpeterian growth theories describe the relationship between product market
regulation, competition and innovation as non-linear. This is the outcome of a race between
two opposite forces (Aghion et al., 2013a). The first one is the pure competition effect of
the old Schumpeterian tradition, which interprets ex-ante monopoly rents as a pre-requisite
to innovate. The second one reflects the escaping-competition effect, which predicts that
firms innovate to overcome competitors and earn ex-post monopoly rents. The former force
prevails in ‘unlevelled’ markets where incumbents dominate, the latter in markets where firms
are technologically contiguous and there is ‘neck-to-neck’ competition. In levelled markets,
if firms do not collude, the fiercer the competition the higher the share of market profits
going to the firm that innovates. On the contrary, in unlevelled markets, if competition
increases, the incumbent’s profitability reduces. On the aggregate, it emerges an inverted
U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation which depends on the amount of
sectors that are in the levelled state (composition effect). If the initial level of competition
is low because of strict regulation, lowering administrative barriers should result in a faster
rate of innovation. Conversely, when competition is initially high, there is little incentive for
the laggard in an unlevelled state to innovate. One key prediction of this framework is that
regulation discourages innovation the closer a firm to the frontier, but not far from it.
This general growth setting can be adapted to yield a large array of results. Amable
et al. (2009) hypothesize that the R&D effort of the market leader raises the difficulty for the
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follower to innovate and move one step ahead along the product quality ladder. Under this
condition, the relationship between competition and innovation may be U-shaped and the
effect of competition (regulation) on innovation be harmful closer to (far from) the frontier.
Bourle`s et al. (2013) adapts the mainstream framework of Schumpeterian growth to allow for
the knock-on effects of product market regulation, i.e. how regulation in upstream industries
influences the economic performance of downstream firms and industries that use regulated
intermediate factors such as service inputs.1 Because of barriers to entry, licensing, etc.,
downstream firms access to such inputs at higher prices or lower quality than in a market
without frictions. These unfavourable conditions inhibit firms from outsourcing marginal
tasks, properly allocating factor inputs and efficiently managing their core activities. In this
model, imperfect competition in upstream sectors makes the search for intermediate input
suppliers time-consuming and costly for new downstream firms. These costs provide market
power to upstream suppliers, creating a gap between the price and the marginal cost of the
intermediate input. This represents a barrier to entry in downstream markets reducing both
the number of active producers and incentives of these firms to improve efficiency. When
there is an increase in the competitive pressure of upstream markets, the bargaining power
of these suppliers fall, as well as the expected costs for a downstream firm to find a supplier.
Conversely, stronger competition in downstream (levelled) industries increases incentives to
improve R&D efficiency, widening the gap between pre- and post-innovation rents. Summing
up, this model predicts that upstream regulation (competition) reduces (increases) incentives
to efficiency and productivity improvements downstream.
Empirical evidence
The prediction that the relationship between competition and innovation follows an inverted-
U pattern has been supported by Aghion et al. (2005), whereas Aghion et al. (2009) document
that a more intense competition enhances innovation in frontier firms, but discourages it in
1Bourle`s et al. (2013, working paper version) builds upon the model originally developed by Lopez (2010)
which consists in an extension of Aghion et al. (1997).
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non-frontier firms. Evidence departing from this pattern has recently been provided by Cor-
rea and Ornaghi (2014) who found that competition improves innovation and productivity
performance. Griffith et al. (2010) assess the direct effects of own-industry regulation on
innovation output. Examining the EU Single Market Programme’s (SMP) reforms of the
1990s, these authors find that the fall in the administrative barriers to competition low-
ered firm profitability, therefore increasing incentives to carry out R&D; as a result, firms
innovated more and reaped larger productivity benefits.2
Attention has recently been paid to the empirical assessment of the knock-on effects
exerted by product market regulation in service industries. Although these anti-competitive
laws pertain the tertiary sector, their effects spread diffusely throughout the economy with
the inter-industry (input-output) transactions of intermediate inputs (Conway et al., 2006).
Imperfections in intermediate input markets are found to slow productivity growth, especially
because of the deepening of globalization and ICT diffusion, since the 1990s (Arnold et
al., 2011, Bourle`s et al., 2013). However, it remains less explored how the institutional
setting of the intermediate input markets reverberates on R&D of the manufacturing sector.
Amable et al. (2009) show that upstream (service) regulation has a negative impact on
patenting for countries far from the frontier, whilst this effect is positive for technology
leaders. Consistently, Sanyal and Ghosh (2013) find that patenting in the field of electrical
technology declined after the deregulation of the US electricity market during the 1990s.
Blind (2012) provides evidence that PMR is unrelated to patenting when more dimensions
of regulation policies are accounted for (competition legislation, price control, environmental
laws). Conversely, using cross-sectional data at the firm level, Barbosa and Faria (2011) show
that the probability to innovate is significantly lower in presence of a stricter regulation in
upstream product markets, even when controlling for other institutional factors.
2Aghion et al. (2013b) report that the EU SMP reforms raised innovation in countries characterized by
strong patent rights, but not elsewhere; this effect was more relevant in industries relying on patenting as a
main tool of innovation.
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3 Analytical framework
3.1 Econometric strategy
We study the impact of upstream PMR on innovation efficiency of OECD manufacturing
industries by applying a SFA to a knowledge production function (KPF). Innovation output
(I) is assumed to depend on research input (R), international knowledge spillovers (K),
human capital (H), and financial input (F ):
Iij,t = A · Zθit = ARγ1ij,tKγ2ij,tHγ3ij,tF γ4ij,t. (1)
i denotes industries, j countries, t time. A is an exogenous productivity parameter of R&D.
Z is a factor aggregating function, θ a vector of factor elasticities. Eq. (1) is a variant of
the knowledge production function devised by Ang (2011). We hypothesize that industries
differ for the efficiency in factor usage:
Iij,t = A · Zθit · eαij+τt · evij,t−uij,t . (2)
In natural logs, it is reworded as:
ln Iij,t = α + θ · ln Zit + αij + τt + vij,t − uij,t. (3)
Eq. (3) includes industry-country pair fixed effects in order to account for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity (αij), and year dummies to capture the impact of temporary common
shocks (τt). To determine the knowledge production ‘frontier’, defined as the maximum
attainable output by a given level of inputs, the stochastic component is modeled with a
two-part error structure (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). vij,t is
a normally distributed disturbance capturing random departures from the predicted-by-the-
model output (due to unobserved observation-specific random shocks, measurement errors,
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etc.). uij,t is a half-normally distributed term capturing deviations from the frontier caused
by a sub-optimal input usage, namely R&D inefficiency (Wang, 2007; Fu and Yang, 2009).3
To assess how product market regulation (PMR) affects innovation efficiency, we adopt
the one-step estimator devised by Wang and Schmidt (2002) and Schmidt (2011). It specifies
the inefficiency term as a function of a set of covariates, and estimates their impact jointly
with the determinants of the KPF.4 Assuming
vij,t ∼ N(0, σv) uij,t ∼ N+(0, σuij,t), (4)
the (in)efficiency equation can be expressed (in logs) as a function of an industry-specific
measure of upstream product market regulation (to be described in detail below):
lnσ2uij,t = ρ0 + ρ1 · PMRij,t + ρ′Wt + ηi · t+ µj · t. (5)
W is a vector of institutional controls, available at the country level, used to avoid spurious
correlation between PMR and innovation efficiency that may be induced by competition
policies pursued in the other markets of the economy (technology, labour and finance). ηi’s
are industry-specific time trends capturing changes in structural characteristics of innovation
(i.e. exogenous technical progress). µj’s denote country-specific time trends controlling for
the evolution of the general institutional setting; if omitted, this may be confounded with
the deregulation wave in the product markets started in the early 1990s. The coefficient ρ1
is the key parameter of the analysis as identifying the impact of service regulation on the
(in)efficiency of knowledge generating activities conducted by manufacturing industries.
3Unreported sensitivity results indicate that (in)efficiency estimates are robust to alternative distributions
(i.e., the exponential function). The choice of the distribution is dictated only by computational tractability
(Greene, 2008, p. 180).
4This procedure outperforms the two-step methodology mostly used in earlier works. The latter consists
of first estimating inefficiency scores from a baseline function (such as for instance our KPF), and then
regressing these values on a set of additional explanatory variables (product market regulation). The two-
step procedure has been shown to yield biased estimates of the (in)efficiency parameters in presence of
omitted variables in the first-step estimation.
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Some properties of the empirical model are worthy to point out. First, as discussed
above, to get consistent estimates, the determinants of the KPF are estimated jointly with
the inefficiency parameters (ρ, ηi, µj) by means of maximum likelihood. Second, the model
is heteroskedastic in uij,t, as the variance of this term depends on (upstream) regulation
measured at the industry-country level (i and j), which is a necessary condition to obtain
unbiased efficiency scores.5 Third, by allowing for individual heterogeneity (αij) and time-
varying (in)efficiency (uij,t), the model circumvents the distortion in the KPF parameters
potentially related to the correlation between industry-country fixed effects and innovation
inputs. If uncontrolled, this ‘pure’ heterogeneity would affect the overall residuals (ij,t =
vij,t − uij,t), leading to an incorrect statement of technical (in)efficiency. The specification
used in this paper is known as the ‘true’ fixed-effects model (Greene, 2005).6
3.2 Data
We use data for fifteen manufacturing industries observed between 1990 and 2002 in ten
OECD countries.7
3.2.1 Determinants of knowledge production
We measure innovation output, Iij,t, with the number of patents granted by the US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Patent counts are distinguished by application year, indus-
try and nationality of the assignee, i.e. the corporate or individual holding the intellectual
5See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, pp. 272-3) and Caudill and Ford (1993).
6Our work extends previous research in the field. For instance, Fu and Yang (2009) disentangle patenting
at the economy-wide level into the effects of innovation capacity and efficiency, allowing for country fixed-
effects within the (in)efficiency equation but no deterministic element within the frontier. Comparable works,
using a similar specification without fixed effects but focused on output production efficiency, are Kneller
and Stevens (2006) and Henry et al. (2009).
7Details are provided in the Web Appendix. Industry list: Food, beverage and tobacco; Chemicals;
Pharmaceuticals; Rubber and plastics; Other non-metallic minerals; Basic metals; Fabricated metal products;
Machinery; Office machinery; Electrical eq. and apparatus; Communication eq.; Medical and scientific
instruments; Motor vehicles; Other transport eq.; Other manufacturing. Country list: Australia, Canada,
Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, US.
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property right over the patented innovation.8 Research input, Rij,t, is measured by R&D
capital. This variable is obtained from research expenses’ data applying the perpetual inven-
tory method and a geometrical depreciation rate of 15%. As a proxy for the international
knowledge spillovers, we follow Acharya and Keller (2009) and use the imports-weighted
sum across industries and countries of foreign patent stocks. The idea is that technological
knowledge is transmitted through trade and, in their innovation activities, recipient indus-
tries benefit from foreign technology in proportion to the intensity of their imports (see
Franco et al., 2011 and Venturini, 2014 among others).
Human capital and financial input are defined as an exponential function of the labour
share of high-skilled workers and the relative availability of financial funds, respectively (hs
and fd). These variables are expressed in percentage terms and enter linearly the econometric
specification, being our KPF estimated in logs. In essence, human capital is defined in a
Mincherian way and, similarly to Mason et al. (2012), its level is benchmarked to the weight
of low- and medium-skilled workers in the industry, H = exp(hsij,t). This variable should
capture the contribution of total labour quality, and not only that of R&D employees, to
patenting (source: EU KLEMS 2008). Following the literature on the role of financial factors
for R&D (Maskus et al., 2012), we define fd as an interaction between an industry measure
of external finance dependence (benchmarked to the US average values of the 1980s) and a
country-specific, time-varying indicator of financial development. Financial dependence is
defined by the share of external funds on total capital expenditure (Von Furstenberg and Von
Kalckreut, 2006). Financial development is alternatively approximated by the ratio to GDP
of bank credit, private bond market capitalization and stock market capitalization (Beck
8Although patent data mainly account for the output of formal innovation, they present some important
advantages. Firstly, using applications at the USPTO, we work with a standardized measure of innovation
output that reduces measurement errors, as all innovators are subjected to the same IPR law. Secondly, we
cover the portion of innovations with higher quality as firms demand patent protection in the US –the world-
wide leading technology market– only for their most valuable ideas. As patent application data move closer
to the last date in the data set (2006), our series increasingly suffer from missing observations consisting of
patents filed in recent years that have not yet been granted (Hall et al., 2001). To circumvent such truncation
problem, we are forced to work with data until 2002. However, we use information on patent applications
at the European Patent Office as robustness checks.
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and Demirgu¨-Kunt, 2009). As pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998), a lower degree of
financial development is particularly harmful for those industries mostly relying on external
funds to finance innovation and other risky activities (Ang, 2011). fd is designed to capture
cross-sector heterogeneity in the impact of financial input, Fij,t = exp(fdij,t).
3.2.2 Determinants of innovation efficiency
As a proxy for PMR, we use the index of the regulation impact from OECD Product
Market Regulation dataset (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). This indicator measures how
anti-competitive legislation in the tertiary sector reverberates on downstream sectors us-
ing services as factor inputs. In essence, it quantifies anti-competitive regulation in non-
manufacturing industries (energy, transport and communications, retail and professional
services) projecting its effect on downstream industries on the basis of the coefficients of
service input requirements from Input-Output tables. Anti-competitive practices in service
industries include: entry regulation, the extent of public ownership, vertical integration and
the market structure.
To consistently identify the effect of upstream regulation on R&D efficiency we control
for a large set of confounding factors. We account for the institutional setting governing the
functioning of the labor, the technology and the financial market. All these control variables
are available at the country level, reinforcing our choice of including country- and industry-
specific trends within the (in)efficiency term in order to collect unobserved time-varying
heterogeneity.
The strand of studies on the relationship between labor market institutions and innova-
tion is quite extensive. The impact of the regulatory framework does differ in accordance
with the time/country coverage of the analyses, as well as with the institutional profile of
the labor market under assessment (Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). We consider
the strictness of employment protection legislation, distinguishing between the regulation
pertaining the dismissal of regular workers and legislation on temporary contracts (Venn,
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2009). Griffith and Macartney (2014) find that the former is associated with a higher level
of patenting in firms engaged in incremental innovation, as it favours the accumulation of
firm-specific human capital. By contrast, more stringent regulation on temporary workers is
harmful for patenting in turbulent technology markets, where innovation is radical and firms
need to rapidly adjust workforce skills to the new state of technological knowledge.
We also account for the possibility that the capacity to efficiently use R&D resources is
affected by the legal regime of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. More specifi-
cally, we include a measure of IPR protection relative to the US levels (Ginarte and Park,
1997). This country has been historically acknowledged for the strongest system to enforce
innovation and, in our study, is the reference technology market where non-US innovating
firms apply for. According to our view, firms that benefit from a domestic IPR framework
closer to the US standards are likely to better manage R&D, as knowing the administrative
procedure to route patenting, enforce property rights, and license innovation. Samaniego
(2013) provides evidence that IPR enforcement increases innovation spending in high-tech
industries by influencing both the market entry and exit.
The potential impact of financial regulation is examined by a measure of the extent to
which each country has been reforming the financial markets, such as for instance by reducing
state control or barriers to intermediation operations (Abiad et al., 2008). Ang (2011) finds
that financial liberalization is negatively related to patenting as it reduce savings, triggers
financial instability and leads to a disproportionate expansion of the financial sector that
crowds out high-tech industries.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the average value at the country level of the variables entering the KPF and the
institutional factors potentially explaining R&D inefficiency. To increase data comparability,
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in this section we scale patent and R&D variables on the number of employees to account
for the industry size.
Table 1: Determinants of KPF and R&D efficiency: average values 1990-2002
KPF (In)efficiency
I R K H F PMR IPRP EPL EPL FIN
(p.e.) (p.e.) (p.e.) (hs %) (fd %) (%) (rel. %) Reg. Temp. Ref.
AU 2.3 16.3 1114.3 13.2 1.1 7.6 81.5 1.3 0.9 91.6
CA 2.6 25.4 407.1 18.7 1.3 7.0 87.2 1.3 0.3 97.1
DE 1.9 33.0 46.8 13.7 1.4 10.4 91.8 2.7 2.8 88.3
FR 2.4 72.5 98.8 14.8 1.1 10.2 87.8 2.4 3.6 94.1
GB 1.2 40.6 67.4 14.9 1.8 8.7 93.0 1.0 0.3 97.4
IT 0.7 26.1 50.4 4.6 0.9 15.9 90.7 1.8 4.7 79.1
JP 4.8 37.4 34.7 24.1 2.7 11.6 90.9 1.9 1.5 79.5
NL 4.0 57.8 386.5 8.3 1.3 6.9 93.5 3.1 2.1 94.9
SE 3.2 46.5 270.1 14.6 0.7 6.5 89.8 2.9 2.5 94.5
US 6.7 58.7 9.3 34.5 0.8 5.7 100.0 0.2 0.3 94.1
Mean 3.0 41.4 248.5 16.1 1.3 9.1 90.6 1.8 1.9 91.1
a I= Patents; R=R&D stock; K=International technology spillovers; H=Human capital (hs=labour share of high skilled reported); F=Financial
factor (fd=relative financial development reported). p.e.= variables expressed per thousand employee. PMR=upstream product market
regulation. IPRP= IPRs protection (relative to the US). EPL Reg= employment protection legislation on regular contracts. EPL Temp=
employment protection legislation on temporary contracts. FIN Ref=Financial reforms.
In terms of innovation output, US and Japan are the leading countries. Smaller European
economies such as Sweden and the Netherlands rank relatively well, while the UK and Italy
lag behind. Looking at the innovation effort, as measured by R&D stock, France is ahead,
ranking much better than for patents per employee. Australia and Canada are characterized
by a relatively low value of research capital per worker. As expected, smaller countries
display higher values of the technology spillover variable. The United States stand out for
the labour share of high-skilled workers, whereas Japan for the extent of the financial input.
Turning to the determinants of R&D inefficiency, the largest EU countries (Italy, France,
and Germany) and Japan denote the heaviest anti-competitive regulation in services; con-
versely, the US and Sweden fall in the upper tail of the distribution. The UK exhibits levels
of IPRs protection relatively close to the US and, on the financial ground, it was the country
that more intensively liberalised the market between 1990 and 2002. As for employment
protection, the Netherlands emerge for the most restrictive discipline on regular contracts,
Italy on temporary contracts.
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Overall, our descriptive statistics indicate that, in terms of input/output combination,
there is a wide range of possibilities in conducting innovation, as those countries that lead
for patenting not necessarily invested more in research inputs (and viceversa). This may be
due to a different degree of R&D efficiency.
4.2 Estimation results
Table 2 shows the baseline estimates for Eqs. (3) and (5). At first, we look at how R&D
stock, taken alone, contributes to patenting (cols. 1-2). Then, we consider all inputs of the
knowledge production function (cols. 3a-3c). In these regressions, PMR is treated as the sole
determinant of innovation efficiency, whilst the last estimates of the table account for the
full set of institutional factors (cols. 4a-4c). As described above, financial input is defined as
industry financial dependence alternatively multiplied by the value of bank credit, private
bond market capitalisation and stock market capitalisation over GDP.
In cols. (1)-(2) the cumulative value of R&D has a positive and significant effect on
patenting (around 0.25-0.27). The positive coefficient for ρ1 implies that PMR raises the
variance of the inefficiency distribution (0.19) or, put it in other words, that more strin-
gent regulation in service industries is associated with a lower efficiency in the knowledge
generating activities conducted by manufacturing (downstream) industries.9
In regressions (3a) through (3c), we estimate the extended knowledge frontier, finding a
slightly smaller elasticity for R&D capital. International technology spillovers are another
crucial factor for the creation of new technological knowledge. As documented in the litera-
ture (Bottazzi and Peri, 2007), the impact of this variable exceeds returns to internal R&D.
Also, we detect a positive effect of financial input on patenting, which is statistically more
robust when financial development is measured by the ratio to GDP of private bond and
stock market capitalisation, in line with Maskus et al. (2012) and Ang (2011). Conversely,
there is no evidence that the labour quality exerts an effect on innovation output at the
9Notice that parameters of the inefficiency equation cannot be interpreted as marginal effects (Liu and
Myers, 2009). This issue will be addressed in Section 5.
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industry level (see Venturini, 2012 for comparable evidence). It would suggest that only
the human capital of researchers – that is accounted for by the wages paid to these workers
and hence is included in R&D statistics – is significant to patent. In this second group of
regressions, the effect of PMR on the variance of the inefficiency distribution is smaller than
in col. (2).
In order to assess the robustness of the regulation impact, we introduce institutional
controls and find confirmation of our previous results (cols. 4a-4c): the coefficient of PMR
is positive and significant, ranging from 0.126 to 0.180. Looking at the control variables, it
should first be noted that IPRs protection has a negative coefficient; it means that a well
defined set of rules on the technology market helps firms organize at best the entire array of
research tasks (access to finance, R&D operation, innovation licensing, etc.).10 Conversely,
employment protection legislation denotes a strongly heterogeneous impact. Indeed, whereas
the legal discipline on regular contracts does not have a robust effect, protection for tempo-
rary workers remarkably enhances R&D inefficiency. The latter is fully consistent with the
effect found by Griffith and Macartney (2014) on radical innovation of multinational enter-
prises. Liberalizing employment protection for temporary contracts, while leaving in place
stringent regulations on permanent contracts, may have adverse effects on the accumulation
of firm specific human capital, as firms substitute temporary for regular workers and tem-
porary workers are less likely to participate in job-related training (Martin and Scarpetta,
2012). Though, below, we show that these findings hide large cross-country disparities. Fur-
thermore, there is some indication that R&D efficiency is lower in those economies where
financial liberalisation is more pronounced. This finding is in accordance with Ang (2011)
who detects a negative impact of financial reform on patenting. From this perspective, our
work identifies one possible channel through which this effect transits, i.e. R&D efficiency.
There are some reasons that can motivate this finding. First, changes in the sources (and the
10The relationship between IPR stringency and innovation remains a debated issue (Boldrin and Levine,
2013). Furthermore, the strength of patent protection may interplay with the policies pursued in other
markets, for instance enhancing the positive impact of product market liberalization on R&D and patenting
(Aghion et al., 2013b).
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extent) of funding may force firms to re-organize R&D activities, and this implies sustaining
large adjustment costs. Second, the higher financial instability induced by financial reforms
in the short run may increase inefficiencies in firm operations. Third, knowledge generat-
ing activities may be crowded out by the disproportionate expansion of the financial sector
resulting from liberalization, as this distorts the allocation of highly skilled workers away
from the research sector. Putting this finding in perspective with estimates of the KPF,
our evidence suggests that a large availability of financial funds is beneficial to innovation
output as providing resources to carry out research activities; though, an excessive (or a too
fast) deregulation of the financial market is harmful as, in the short and medium run, it
may generate inefficiencies in how these activities are conducted. These results are widely
confirmed by robustness checks below.11
Before proceeding with the sensitivity analysis, we assess the validity of the model’s
assumptions by conducting generalized likelihood-ratio tests on parameters (Table 3). As a
first check, we examine whether inefficiency is truly contained in the data and, to this aim,
we test the baseline knowledge production ‘frontier’ (col. 1, Table 2) against the ‘average’
knowledge production function (the latter would imply uij,t = 0 for all ij, t.) The LR test
for the hypothesis that σu=0 indicates that the variance of the inefficiency term statistically
differs from 0 (χ2=20.6), confirming the validity of our assumptions. Moreover, we evaluate
whether the set of both industry/countries fixed effects and time dummies are significant
in the KPF (αij = 0 or τt = 0), finding confirmation for both hypotheses. Finally, we
assess the significance of the inefficiency equation’s parameters using regression (4a) as a
benchmark, given that it provides a more conservative value for the PMR parameter. When
covariates are considered altogether, or PMR is taken alone, the null hypothesis is always
refuted, proving that R&D (in)efficiency depends on institutional factors and the model is
heteroskedastic.12
11We thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.
12Unreported LR tests indicate that industry- and country-specific time trends included into the ineffi-
ciency term are always different from zero. It confirms that, to consistently estimate the effect of upstream
regulation, it is crucial to control for the deterministic evolution of this variable over time. In accordance
17
Table 3: Generalized LR tests on parameters of the frontier model
Null Hypothesis Specification Conditions χ2 statistics Critical values (5%)
No inefficiency 1 σu=0 20.56 2.71
a
No Industry/country dummies 1 αij=0 5318.54 178.48
No Year dummies 1 τt=0 704.95 21.02
No heteroskedasticity in uij,t = 0 (4a) ρk 6=0=0 1091.88 42.55
No PMR effect upon uij,t = 0 (4a) ρ1=0 10.74 3.84
a This test is at the boundary of parameter space (σu); the critical value comes from Kodde and Palm (1986).
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we carry out a battery of robustness checks to verify whether the regulation
impact changes when accounting for a different set of inputs within the KPF (Table 4), for
parameter heterogeneity among country groups (Table 5) and possible endogeneity, omitted
variables and measurement errors in estimating the R&D inefficiency (Table 6).
In Table 4, we first use a proxy for financial input based on the degree of asset tangibility,
in place of external finance dependence. The firm’s need for external funds may be indeed
ultimately determined by capital structure and, hence, asset tangibility could better capture
industry variation in the use of financial input (Maskus et al., 2012).13 In col. (1), we do
not observe any change in the effect of financial input whilst, in absolute terms, the impact
of the inefficiency determinants is larger. Then, we introduce a time-varying control for the
industrial structure, defined as the sector share on total employment, to assess whether the
expanding industries patent more because of larger technological or commercial opportuni-
ties. This expectation is confirmed by regression (2) in which we also find a positive and
statistically significant effect for labour quality. In col. (3), we account for heterogeneity
in trade specialization. The propensity to patent in the US might indeed reflect the export
intensity of a country towards this market.14 However, when we include the US share of
with Fiori et al. (2012), when time trends are omitted PMR turns out to be insignificant. Our model is
sufficiently articulated and introducing country-year fixed effects, to control for country-specific economic
shocks that may induce product market reforms, does not improve estimates due to convergence problems.
13Asset tangibility is given by the average share of structure, transport and non-ICT equipment on total
capital expenditure, observed on the US industries in the 1980s. Notice that the high correlation between the
measures of financial input based on external finance dependence and asset tangibility inhibits the inclusion
of both variables within the same specification.
14For the US, we consider the cross-country average value of import shares.
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industry exports, this variable has a negative impact on patenting, albeit not economically
relevant. This finding may be explained with the use of country-industry fixed effects, time
dummies and the trade specialisation variable within the same specification. In the last two
columns of Table 4 we respectively use R&D expenses (in real terms) as a measure of research
input (col. 4), and weight patent indicators with forward citations to account for the quality
of innovation (col. 5). In these regressions the impact of R&D input is substantially smaller
whilst the spillover effect varies with the specification used; conversely, the parameter of
PMR is broadly and stably larger than in our benchmark specification (col. 4a, Table 2).
Table 5 examines the results’ sensitivity to the composition of country sample. In such
estimates, we use the full set of financial development indicators to better account for cross-
country disparities in the functioning of the financial market. In cols. (1a)-(1c), we exclude
the US to rule out the possible home bias associated with the usage of USPTO data to
measure innovation output. Estimates do not change remarkably but, as expected, the
impact of PMR is stronger.
As discussed above (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Inklaar et al., 2008), there is large
consensus that the EU has been struggling in terms of productivity performance because of
an institutional architecture of the markets less conducive to economic growth. We assess
this hypothesis by re-estimating the model considering the EU member states only (cols.
2a-2c). Interestingly, the impact of product market regulation on R&D efficiency does not
systematically differ from the rest of the sample. Rather, in Europe, research efficiency has
been depressed by the legal discipline of regular labour contracts (whilst it is unrelated to
the protection for temporary workers). These results conform to the analysis on the drivers
of the productivity catch-up carried out by Bassanini et al. (2009) on OECD countries.15
Another valuable finding is that the detrimental effect of financial deregulation on innovation
efficiency is much stronger than resulting from our previous estimates.
15We also inspect whether there is heterogeneity in the impact of PMR according to the technological base
of production. There is evidence that high-tech sectors are less influenced by PMR; however, this finding is
quite sensitive to the grouping criterion.
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In Table 6, we address endogeneity, omitted variables and measurement errors problems
in the estimation of R&D inefficiency. Endogeneity may derive from simultaneity feed-
backs from R&D performance to the stringency of upstream regulation. In essence, the
most successful innovators may grow in size and decide to internalize service tasks to escape
unfavourable conditions imposed by service providers. This would lower interindustry trans-
actions of intermediate inputs reducing the value of the regulation indicator. In this case,
causality would run from innovation to upstream regulation and the estimated effect of PMR
would be upward biased. To mitigate this risk, we estimate our model by using one- and
three-year lags of the regulation indicator (cols. 1a-1b). In such regressions, the parameter of
PMR is still significant, fluctuating around the value of our benchmark specification (0.126).
Similarly, in col. (1c) we estimate the KPF using the one-year lagged values of innovation
inputs, obtaining a larger coefficient for PMR. More generally, firms’ usage of intermediate
inputs may respond to, or anticipate, changes in service regulation irrespective of the out-
come of R&D activities. To overcome this reverse-causality problem, it is a standard practice
to adopt the structure of intermediate input transactions of a benchmark country, assum-
ing that it approximates (exogenous) industry technological differences and that these are
common across countries (Barone and Cingano, 2011). To this aim, we build an alternative
indicator of upstream regulation using the intermediate transaction coefficients of the US as
weights (taken from 1990 input-output tables) and exclude this country from the analysis.
This practice may however fail when industry technologies are heterogeneous across countries
and idiosyncratic shocks to the US economy are larger than those affecting other countries
(Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2010). The former would consist in a measurement error leading
to upward biased coefficients for those countries with a (relatively) technologically backward
structure of the economy (amplification bias). The latter would result in a classical measure-
ment error attenuating the PMR parameter towards zero (attenuation bias). Results in col.
(1d) seem in accordance with the latter explanation as the coefficient of upstream regulation
is no longer statistically significant. Overall, notwithstanding the relatively long time lag
22
between the design and the implementation of the changes in competition legislation and
our attempts to minimize reverse-causality problems, we cannot exclude that some residual
endogeneity may affect our findings.
To further refine the assessment of the institutional factors influencing R&D efficiency,
in col. (2) we include country-wide rates of union density.16 Trade unions may act as
a hindrance to innovation when this leads to firm re-structuring or worker dismissal, de-
termining an inefficient factor allocation (Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003, Venturini,
2012). This expectation is confirmed by regression (2) in which, though, the coefficient of
other institutional factors remains unaffected.
Finally, we evaluate our results to the use of alternative patent data. Specifically, we
adopt patent applications at the European Patent Office (source: OECD EPO patent
database) and with such data we are able to extend the analysis up to 2007 (cols. 3a
and 3b). EPO patents yield quite different results (col. 3a) both for the determinants of
the KPF and the R&D efficiency. In the frontier, we find a smaller effect for R&D capital
and larger international spillovers, whereas labour quality is more statistically related to
patenting; in contrast with most previous studies, financial input is found to reduce inno-
vation output. More importantly, R&D efficiency is estimated less precisely and, now, only
EPL on temporary contracts shows an impact consistent with our previous estimates. The
coefficient of PMR is still positive but not significant. These findings may be explained with
a lower quality content of EPO patents which refer to the demands for patent protection and
these may not be accepted at the end of the examination because of the lack of novelty and
originality (contrarily USPTO application data that refer to granted patents). In general,
estimates based on EPO seem to suffer a larger home bias.17
16Union density is defined as the percentage ratio between trade union members and the total number of
wage and salary earners.
17This is also witnessed by running regressions (3a)-(3b) separately for the EU and non-EU countries; for
the latter, as our modelling of R&D efficiency shows a very low explanatory power.
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5 Discussion
This section discusses the econometric results and the associated policy implications. As
a first step, we compute the mean efficiency scores for each industry/country pair from
our benchmark specification (col. 4a, Table 2). In Figure 1, we report the country average
scores evaluated at three reference years.18 It should be observed that, despite the economet-
ric model includes a number of country-specific deterministic elements, well-defined nation-
wide patterns emerge in efficiency performance. In our sample, there are two outstanding
economies: Japan and the US. The Netherlands and Sweden rapidly improved their per-
formance during the 1990s, probably as a result of the increasing specialisation in (some)
high-tech productions. Interestingly, Italy ranks relatively well in efficiency terms, albeit
being a laggard either for innovative output or research effort. Table 7 details average ef-
ficiency scores by country and industry, revealing that disparities between the leading and
following countries are larger in technologically advanced industries, such as office machinery,
electrical equipment, communication equipment and other transport equipment.
Next, we calculate the marginal effect of upstream regulation with a view to raising the
economic interpretation of the econometric results. In doing so, we track how the unit impact
18Efficiency scores are calculated for each country j on an annual base as:
∑
i TEij,t/I, where TEij,t =
exp(−ûij,t). Inefficiency scores are obtained through the conditional (to the overall residual) mean estimator,
corrected for heteroskedasticity, developed by Jondrow et al. (1982):
ûij,t = E (uij,t|ij,t) =
σvσuij,t
σij,t
 φ
(
ij,tλij,t
σ
)
1− Φ
(
ij,tλij,t
σij,t
) − (ij,tλij,t
σij,t
) ,
where σij,t =
√
σ2v + σ
2
uij,t , λij,t = σuij,t/σv, and φ(·) and Φ(·) denote, respectively, the density function and
the cumulative function of the standard normal distribution. Estimates of ij,t are directly recoverable from
eq. (3): ̂ij,t = Iij,t − α̂ − θ̂ lnZij,t − α̂ij − τ̂t. The employed empirical specification (Eq. 3) of the KPF is
well-suited to separate out the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity component, α̂ij , from time-variant
inefficiency at the industry/country level, ûij,t. Nonetheless, along with ’pure’ heterogeneity, α̂ij may also
capture the time-invariant part of efficiency (as underlined by Pieri and Zaninotto (2013, pp. 411-2) among
others), and it could be consequently used in the calculation of the efficiency scores. However, as Kumbhakar
et al. (2014, pp. 325-6) point out, the method used to compute the efficiency scores is mainly a matter of
parameters’ interpretation decided by the researcher. Furthermore, rather encouragingly, the Pearson and
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between TEij,t = exp(ûij,t) and α̂ij- ûij,t (0.57 and 0.65) indicate a
wide similarity between these two ’ways’ of computing the efficiency scores.
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Figure 1: Average technical efficiency by country, selected years
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of PMR changes along its distribution in order to verify whether there are non-linearities in
the effect of this variable.19
The mean partial effect amounts to 0.022. It implies that an unit decrease in regulation
is associated with a 2.2% increase (reduction) in R&D efficiency (inefficiency) and, through
this channel, in patenting. This value is comparable in size to the effect of PMR on the
employment rate (0.3-0.4%), investment (1%), and convergence rates towards the produc-
tivity frontier (6-12%) found in earlier studies.20 Intuitively, using the sample average value
19Following Liu and Myers (2009), marginal effects are defined as:
∂ [E (uij,t| lnZij,t, PMRij,t,W)]
∂PMRij,t
.
20See respectively Fiori et al. (2012), Alesina et al. (2005), Bourle`s et al. (2013).
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Table 7: Efficiency scores by country and industry: averages
Industry \ Country AU CA DE FR GB IT JP NL SE US TOTAL
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.59 0.73 0.79 0.69 0.64 0.71 0.87 0.53 0.55 0.84 0.69
Chemicals 0.71 0.86 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.96 0.79 0.81 0.95 0.87
Pharmaceuticals 0.58 0.65 0.86 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.88 0.60 0.56 0.81 0.72
Rubber and plastics 0.71 0.86 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.78 0.95 0.74 0.69 0.93 0.84
Other non-metallic minerals 0.73 0.82 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.82 0.94 0.72 0.68 0.92 0.82
Basic metals 0.65 0.82 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.66 0.92 0.58 0.63 0.90 0.76
Fabricated metal products 0.61 0.78 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.74 0.93 0.55 0.69 0.91 0.77
Machinery 0.86 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.98 0.86 0.85 0.97 0.92
Office machinery 0.38 0.53 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.86 0.36 0.41 0.76 0.59
Electrical equipment and apparatus 0.49 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.79 0.70 0.84 0.29 0.64 0.87 0.70
Communication equipment 0.52 0.54 0.67 0.79 0.81 0.69 0.89 0.38 0.47 0.82 0.66
Medical and scientific instruments 0.74 0.83 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.95 0.54 0.74 0.92 0.83
Motor vehicles 0.71 0.66 0.77 0.85 0.81 0.72 0.91 0.56 0.63 0.88 0.75
Other transport equipment 0.64 0.56 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.59 0.84 0.41 0.56 0.87 0.68
Other manufacturing 0.73 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.82 0.94 0.65 0.69 0.92 0.83
TOTAL 0.64 0.74 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.91 0.57 0.64 0.88 0.76
as benchmark, our evidence indicates that if upstream regulation halved (from 9 to 4.5%),
R&D efficiency would increase by 10%, and the number of patents would approximately rise
from 3 to 3.3 per thousand employee.
Figure 2 plots the partial effect of upstream regulation on R&D inefficiency observed
on each industry/country pair against the PMR distribution, as well as the corresponding
linear interpolations, at the beginning and at the end of the sample period (denoted in
grey and black, respectively). The graph also reports the average marginal impact at the
country level (marked by red diamonds and blue circles). Figure 2 illustrates four main
points. First, the effect of regulation on inefficiency is positive along the entire distribution
of PMR. Second, the highest unit impact is not found for the most regulated countries (Italy,
Japan and Germany), but for the economies more prone to market competition such as the
Netherlands (negative slopes). Third, the unit impact of regulation decreased during the
1990s as a result of the deregulation wave (closer interpolation line to the x-axis in 2002).
Forth, in terms of R&D efficiency, the cost of regulation is higher after liberalization (steeper
slope in 2002). Overall, our findings indicate that product market reform programmes are
unlikely to produce sizeable effects on R&D efficiency at the earlier stages of deregulation,
similarly to what found by Alesina et al. (2005) on investment. Figure 2 shows that the
27
negative relationship between marginal impact and level of regulation strengthened during
the 1990s as OECD economies started opening their product markets. The partial impact of
PMR was largely heterogeneous among countries at the beginning of the 1990s, but in the
subsequent decade it converged both in terms of levels and dispersion.
Our results indicate that for late reformers, although the unit benefits from deregulation
are relatively modest, total gains may be substantial. For instance, if Italy reduced service
regulation to the US levels (i.e. a ten points reduction), it could obtain a 22% increase in
R&D efficiency and patenting (total gains = unit impact × change in regulation levels).
This value largely exceeds the benefits that could be obtained from convergence towards to
the US standards by a low regulated country such as Canada (2.9%=2.2% × 1.3).
Figure 2: Marginal effect of PMR on inefficiency
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6 Concluding remarks
As R&D-based endogenous growth theories influentially state, knowledge creation is one of
the crucial forces to expand at a stable rate in the global economy. However, the ability
to efficiently manage R&D resources, and therefore to achieve better growth performances,
cannot be taken for granted.
There is widespread evidence indicating that barriers to competition hamper the market
entry and the arrival of new innovations. Thus far, less explored has been the issue of how
the regulation in the upstream product markets reverberates on downstream innovation.
This paper has filled this lack undertaking a stochastic frontier analysis on the knowledge
production function of a large sample of OECD industries, investigating whether regulation
in the service sector influences efficiency levels in innovation activities conducted by the
manufacturing industries.
Our econometric analysis clearly shows that upstream PMR depresses R&D efficiency
downstream. This finding is robust to controlling for a large array of institutional factors
such as IPR protection, employment protection legislation and financial regulation. In the
post-estimation analysis, we have computed the marginal effect of PMR and verified whether
its unit impact changes with the stringency of the regulatory setting. We have seen that
the detrimental effect of this institutional factor is stronger in less regulated economies. The
negative relationship between unit impact and level of regulation strengthened during the
1990s when product market reforms were launched by most OECD economies. These findings
have important implications for policy-making as suggesting that significant improvements
in R&D efficiency, patenting, and more generally innovation outcomes, cannot be achieved in
a relatively short-term horizon, or at the beginning of the deregulation programmes. Market
liberalization takes time to produce widespread effects within the economy. In absolute
terms, gains from deregulation are however more relevant for those countries starting from
a more restrictive setting to competition.
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